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Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court:
The Not-So-Exclusive Remedy Rule
California courts have been sharply split during the past two de-
cades over whether workers' compensation should be the exclusive
remedy for an employee who is injured by his or her employer's inten-
tional torts.' In Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court,2 the
California Supreme Court discussed this broad issue at length, but de-
clined to resolve it. The court held that while workers' compensation is
the exclusive remedy for initial injuries suffered by an asbestos worker
whose employer allegedly concealed the dangers of the job, the em-
ployee could sue for aggravation of his injuries caused by the alleged
fraudulent concealment of the disease and its cause.3
This Comment examines the question of workers' compensation
exclusivity in California, emphasizing three broad groups of job-re-
lated intentional torts: workplace assault and battery, intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, and employer concealment of
employment hazards and diseases. The Comment discusses the reasons
for and against allowing common-law suits against the employer for
these torts. It also examines whether the California statute that pro-
vides for additional compensation when the employer is guilty of "seri-
ous and willful misconduct"4 precludes common-law suits. The
Comment concludes with an analysis of the Johns-Manville opinion
and its effect on the exclusive-remedy rule.
Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court
Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court5 is one of an esti-
mated 8,000 cases in the nation involving exposure to asbestos.6 The
1. See, e.g., Magliulo v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621
(1975); Azevedo v. Abel, 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968).
California uses the term workers' compensation to refer to what was traditionally
known as workmen's compensation. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3200 (West Supp. 1981). Most
states still use the latter term. This Note will use the term "workers' compensation" except
in references to specific state "workmen's compensation" laws.
2. 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980).
3. Id. at 469, 612 P.2d at 950, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
4. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp 1981).
5. 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980).
6. Rout, Product-Liability Law Is in 7ux as Attorneys Test a Radical Doctrine, Wall
St. J., Dec. 30, 1980, at 1, 8 col. 4. Although many of the asbestos cases do not involve suits
against the plaintif's employer, the issue involved in Johns-Manville has arisen elsewhere.
See Copeland v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 492 F. Supp. 498 (D. N.J. 1980) (employee
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plaintiff7 in Johns-Mfanville alleged that he had developed asbestos-re-
lated illnesses from his exposure to the substance over the course of
twenty-nine years at the corporation's plant. He further alleged that
the corporation had known since 1924 of the dangers of asbestos, yet
had concealed that knowledge from him, advising him that it was safe
to work in close proximity to the substance. The plaintiff also asserted
that doctors retained by the employer had not been furnished with ade-
quate information about the risk of asbestos exposure and that the em-
ployer had failed to advise the doctors that the plaintiff was developing
pulmonary disease as the result of working conditions at the plant.
Contending that he would have been protected had the dangers of as-
bestos been revealed, the plaintiff claimed that the corporation had
falsely and fraudulently concealed the dangers to induce him to con-
tinue working, unaware of the risks involved.8
The supreme court held that the plaintiff's action was not barred
by the exclusivity provision 9 of the workers' compensation law.' 0 The
court agreed with Johns-Manville that allegations of intentional mis-
conduct against the employer are usually covered by the workers' com-
pensation provision for "serious and willful misconduct,"II and thus do
not justify a common-law cause of action.' 2 The court, however, per-
ceived a "trend" towards allowing a common-law tort suit when the
employer deliberately injures the employee, or when the intentional
suit charging concealment of asbestos hazards barred by New Jersey workers' compensation
law); Petruska v. Johns-Manville, 83 F.R.D. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (employee suit charging
concealment of asbestos hazards barred by Pennsylvania workers' compensation law); Mc-
Daniel v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 487 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (employee allowed
to sue employer for alleged concealment of asbestos hazards, intentional and felonious
poisoning, fraud, and misrepresentation). See also Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
508 F. Supp. 313, 316-17 (D. Me. 1981) (asbestos manufacturers' third-party action against
worker's employer, seeking contribution and indemnity for their possible liability in
worker's wrongful death action, barred by exclusive-remedy provision of Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act; Johns-Manville v. Superior Court's distinction be-
tween initial injury and aggravation of injury cited).
7. Real party in interest and plaintiff Reba Rudkin died of lung cancer before the
supreme court decision. Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d at
470, 612 P.2d at 951, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 861. Rudkin's suit was consolidated with several
others filed by former employees at Johns-Manville's Pittsburg, California plant. The
supreme court's disposition of the Rudkin action also allowed the other plaintiffs to proceed
to trial. Id. at 470 n.3, 612 P.2d at 951 n.3, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 861 n.3. The first such trial
began in November, 1981. Shinoff, Benchmark asbestos suit to come to trial this week, S.F.
Examiner, Nov. 29, 1981, § B at 1, col. 1.
8. Id. at 469-70, 612 P.2d at 950-51, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
9. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1981). See notes 35-36 & accompanying text
supra.
10. 27 Cal. 3d at 469, 612 P.2d at 950, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
11. Id. at 473, 612 P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553
(West Supp. 1981)).
12. Id. at 474, 612 P.2d at 954, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
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misconduct results in the aggravation of a work-related injury.'3 The
plaintiff's allegations of what the court called "egregious"' 4 and "fla-
grant' 5 conduct were held sufficient to state a cause of action for ag-
gravation of the disease, although not sufficient to state a cause of
action based on the hazards of the employment that caused him to con-
tract the disease. 16
Johns-Aanville shows both a determination to adhere to the exclu-
sive-remedy rule and a willingness to relax the rule in "rare instances of
malicious oppression."' 17 It thus fails to resolve the debate over the ex-
clusivity bar in cases of intentional torts.
Background of the Exclusivity Rule
Workers' compensation laws make compensation the exclusive
remedy for an injured worker against his or her employer, if the injury
falls within the coverage formula of the statute and if the employer has
secured compensation insurance as required by law.' 8 Exclusivity is
13. Id. at 476, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
14. Id. at 478, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 477, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
17. McGee v. McNally, 119 Cal. App. 3d 891, 895, 174 Cal. Rptr. 253, 256 (1981).
18. 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.00 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as LARSON]. No American jurisdiction gives an employee covered by workers'
compensation the option to sue for damages in the absence of employer non-compliance
with the act or an employer's misconduct. The employer's failure to secure compensation,
however, allows the employee to sue. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3706 (West Supp. 1981).
Seven states statutorily authorize common-law suits against the employer when the lat-
ter commits certain kinds of torts. Aiuz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022 (1970) (employee has
option to sue for willful misconduct); IDAHO CODE § 72-209(3) (1973) (willful or unpro-
voked physical aggression grounds for suit); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 44 (1957) (suit al-
lowed for torts of "deliberate intention"); OR. Rav. STAT. § 656.156 (1979) (same); WASH.
R .CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 (1981 Supp.) (same); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (Michie Supp.
1978) (same); Tax. REv. Cwv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 5 (Vernon 1967) (exemplary damages
allowed for death caused by willful act or omission or gross negligence).
In several other states, judicial decisions have allowed tort suits. See, e.g., Boek v.
Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930); Lavin v. Goldberg Bldg. Material Corp.,
274 A.D. 690, 693-94, 87 N.Y.S.2d 90, 93 (1949); Le Pochat v. Pendleton, 187 Misc. 296, 298,
63 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315-16 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Readinger v. Gottschall, 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 134,
138, 191 A.2d 694, 696 (1963); Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35
(1940).
Another 10 states impose percentage penalties on the employer in the form of addi-
tional compensation for various kinds of misconduct or violation of safety statutes or orders.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp. 1981) (50%, but not more than $10,000, for serious and
willful misconduct); KY. REv. STAT. § 342.165 (1978) (15%); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 28
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1965) (100% for serious and willful misconduct); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 287.120 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (15%); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-108 (1978) (10%); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-12 (1977) (10%); OHno CONST. art. II, § 35 (15-50% in discretion of board); S.C.
CODE § 42-9-70 (1976) (10%); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-12 (1974) (15%); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.57 (West 1973) (15%, but not more than $7,500).
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part of the quidpro quo by which workers were granted a dependable,
although modest, compensation for job-related injuries and were re-
lieved of the need to prove an employer's negligence and the employer
was spared the burden of defending against common-law suits.19
While workers' compensation continues to provide a dependable mini-
mum of compensation, benefit levels have failed to keep pace with in-
flation.20 As a result, employees often try to bring their actions outside
of the workers' compensation system, while employers, who once op-
posed workers' compensation, now strenuously advocate it to avoid
large damage verdicts.21
California originally gave the worker the option to sue rather than
to accept compensation when the injury was caused by the "personal
gross negligence or wilful personal misconduct of the employer" or by
the employer's violation of a safety statute.22 This provision of the
original 1911 act was retained in the 1913 amendments to the act. 23
The 1917 amendments to the California compensation act, predecessor
of the current workers' compensation system, eliminated the worker's
option to sue, providing instead that "serious and wilful misconduct"
by the employer was grounds for a fifty percent increase in compensa-
tion benefits, up to a maximum of $2,500.24 "Serious and wilful mis-
conduct" was defined in an early California Supreme Court opinion as
"conduct which the employer either knew, or ought to have known, if
he had turned his mind to the matter, to be conduct likely to jeopardize
19. 2A LARSON, supra note 18, at §§ 65.10, 67.30.
20. Workers' compensation systems are intended to compensate for lost wages, not to
compensate for pain and suffering. The low benefits make questionable the achievement of
even this modest goal. See generally Comment, Workmen's Compensation: Arizona's Elusive
Exclusive Remedy, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 485, 496-501. In California, the maximum weekly
payment is currently $175. See 2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES
AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 12.01 [2] (1981).
21. See Hopkins, Executive Officer Suits Under the Combination Casualty Policy, 25
FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 169, 172 (1975): "Although employers had contested the passage by
legislatures of the compensation acts because of the projected cost factor, this turned out not
(necessarily) to be the case. In actuality, the protection of employers from very large tort
suits far outweighed any actual expenses that the employers had to pay in compensation
benefits." See generally J. MASTORIS, CIVIL LITIGATION AND WORKERS COMPENSATION Vi
(1980): "Ever since the advent of the Workers' Compensation Act, ingenious attorneys rep-
resenting injured workers have sought ways and means of obtaining greater benefits than the
workers' compensation award." The Mastoris treatise is an excellent and concise summary
of the law pertaining to the exclusivity rule in California, and contains an extensive discus-
sion of the Johns-Manville decision.
22. 1911 Cal. Stats. ch. 399, § 3, at 796-97 (repealed 1913).
23. 1913 Cal. Stats. ch. 176, § 12(b), at 283-84 (repealed 1917).
24. 1917 Cal. Stats. ch. 586, § 6(b), at 834. The serious and willful misconduct provi-
sion is now CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp. 1981), which provides a 50% penalty up to
a maximum of $10,000.
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the safety of his employees. 25
California's provision for a fifty percent penalty in cases of serious
and willful misconduct, with a present ceiling of $10,000,26 lessens the
harshness of the exclusivity rule by providing additional compensation
to an injured employee. In addition, because the employer cannot in-
sure against liability for serious and willful misconduct, he or she is
penalized by this provision.27 The provision, however, has not satisfied
critics of exclusivity and has failed to stop judicial erosion of the exclu-
sive remedy rule.
Shortcomings of Compensation
Workers' compensation is not designed to compensate for pain
and suffering, as does a tort remedy.28 It is intended to pay a worker's
medical bills and to compensate the worker for his or her lost wages.
Although it is not as lucrative as some tort awards, 29 employees benefit
from liberal construction of the scope-of-employment provisions,
which covers almost all job-related accidents or injuries.30 The elimi-
nation of the contributory or comparative negligence defense and the
imposition of no-fault liability on the employer also benefit the
25. E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 184 Cal. 180, 188, 193 P.
105, 108 (1920).
26. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp. 1981).
27. CAL. INS. CODE § 11661 (West 1972). Insurance can, however, cover the cost of
defending against a misconduct charge. The court in Azevedo v. Abel, 264 Cal. App. 2d
451, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968), considered at length the argument that exclusivity allows a
party to insure against its own willful torts, in violation of California's public policy. See
CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1972); CAL. CirV. CODE § 1668 (West 1973). The.4zevedo court
rejected this argument, holding that the employer's inability to obtain insurance against lia-
bility for serious and willful misconduct fulfills the public policy banning insurance against
willful injury.
28. 2A LARSON, supra note 18, at § 65.20. "As for physical pain and suffering, unless it
interferes with earning capacity, no allowance can be made in a compensation award; never-
theless, a common-law suit for pain and suffering from a work-connected injury will not
lie." Id.
29. See note 27 infra.
30. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1981). "Labor Code provisions extending
workers' compensation benefits are to be liberally construed in favor of the application of
those benefits ... even where it might be to the advantage of a particular plaintiff to avoid
them and seek a remedy at law." Machado v. Hulsman, 119 Cal. App. 3d 453, 455-56, 173
Cal. Rptr. 842-43 (1981) (citing 2 B. WrrKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 856 (8th ed.
1971)); see Cal. Lab. Code § 3202 (West Supp. 1981); see also Balido v. Improved Machin-
ery, Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 650, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 902 (1972) (Compton, J., concurring
and dissenting). A dramatic example of the broad construction of "scope of employment"
for purposes of extending workers' compensation benefits is a Michigan case in which a
worker, traveling abroad, died from carbon monoxide poisoning in the "course and scope"
of a romantic encounter on a business trip. Husband's Fatal Affair Is Ruled Job-Related,
S.F. Chronicle, June 18, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
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worker.31
Serious inequities remain, however. When compensation acts
were passed, it was difficult to win a tort verdict. In ensuing decades,
damage verdicts with large awards for pain and suffering and with pu-
nitive damages have become more common. 32 At the same time, work-
ers' compensation benefit levels have remained low, 33 making it
advantageous for employees to circumvent the exclusivity provisions of
compensation acts.34
Under the California workers' compensation system, compensa-
tion is the exclusive remedy against the employer for injury or death of
an employee if "the conditions of compensation exist."135 The "condi-
tions of compensation" exist in almost all employee injuries arising out
of and in the course of employment.36 Certain injuries, however, re-
main uncompensated. For instance, an on-the-job sexual assault often
31. Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 650, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890,
902 (1972) (Compton, J., concurring and dissenting).
32. Page, The Exclusivity of the Workmen's Compensation Remedy: The Employee's
Right to Sue His Employer in Tort, 4 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 555, 556-57 (1963). Mr.
Page's exposition of the wide disparity between tort and workers' compensation awards was
prophetic in light of the large awards returned by juries in the ensuing two decades. See,
e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482
(1979) ($5,000,000 punitive damages award in bad-faith insurance case reversed on appeal);
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (jury awards
$2,500,000 compensatory damages and $125,000,000 punitive damages to auto accident vic-
tim; trial judge's reduction of punitive award to $3,500,000 affirmed on appeal); Karjala v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975) ($200,000 verdict in strict prod-
ucts liability action against asbestos maker affirmed); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) ($79,436 verdict against six defendants in seminal strict
liability asbestos case). Moreover, the fear of such awards has induced defendants to settle
for large sums. See, e.g., Williams v. Schwartz, 61 Cal. App. 3d 628, 131 Cal. Rptr. 200
(1976) (exclusive-remedy provision bars cause of action against employer for emotional dis-
tress suffered by wife who witnesses her husband's fatal fall from a bridge negligently main-
tained by the employer, but third party settles with wife for $175,000); Page, supra, at 557
n. 12 ("84% of all personal injury claims in New York City result in some recovery for plain-
tiff"); S.F. Chronicle, March 14, 1981, at 2, col. 1 (680 asbestos workers settle suit with
asbestos manufacturers for at least $10,000,000). Success in the courts is not guaranteed,
however. See Shinoff, Jury Says "No'to Asbestos- Case Award, S.F. Examiner, Apr. 22, 1981,
§ B, at 10, col. 1 (first of more than 2,000 such cases to come to trial in northern California).
33. See Page, The Exclusivity of the Workmen's Compensation Remedy: The Employee's
Right to Sue His Employer in Tort, 4 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV., 555, 556-57 (1963);
Comment, Workmen's Compensation: Arizona's Elusive Exclusive Remedy, 1974 ARIZ. ST.
LJ. 485, 492-94.
34. See 2A LARSON, supra note 18, at § 65.10; Hopkins, Executive Officer Suits Under
the Combination Casualty Policy, 25 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 169, 172 (1975).
35. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601(a) (West Supp. 1981).
36. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1981). Section 3600 provides in part: "Liabil-
ity for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of any other liability whatsoever
to any person except as provided in Section 3706, shall, without regard to negligence, exist
against an employer for any injury sustained by his employees arising out of and in the
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leaves a victim without a remedy unless there are medical bills or lost
wages to be reimbursed. Barring a common-law suit is inequitable be-
cause the violation of a victim's person often leaves emotional scars,
which are not compensable.37
The work-connected injury to a sexual organ provides another ex-
ample of an injury in which compensation laws bar a damage suit, yet
provide no compensation. 38 Permanent disability benefits are awarded
only for those injuries that adversely affect earning capacity. Sex-im-
pairment injuries generally do not cause work-related physical limita-
tions, do not fall within the accepted meaning of disfigurement, and do
not cause serious psychological damage that permanently impairs earn-
ing power. Unless the injured employee is allowed to maintain a dam-
age suit, he or she is generally unable to recover for the full and
permanent effects of the injury.39
Torts that involve non-physical injuries present a similar problem.
The torts of false imprisonment, libel, malicious prosecution, invasion
of privacy, fraud, deceit, malicious misrepresentation, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, which normally fall outside of the
workers' compensation system, may fall within the system if the tort
course of the employment and for the death of any employee if the injury proximately
causes death, in those cases where the following conditions of compensation concur.
(a) Where, at the time of the injury, both the employer and the employee are subject to
the compensation provisions of this division.
(b) Where, at the time of the injury, the employee is performing service growing out of
and incidental to his employment and is acting within the course of his employment.
(c) Where the injury is proximately caused by the employment, either with or without
negligence.
(d) Where the injury is not caused by the intoxication of the injured employee.
(e) Where the injury is not intentionally self-inflicted.
(f) Where the employee has not willfully and deliberately caused his own death.
(g) Where the injury does not arise out of an altercation in which the injured employee
is the initial physical aggressor."
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3706 (West Supp. 1981) permits a common-law action when the
employer fails to secure insurance.
37. An on-the-job sexual assault is not an impossibility. See, e.g., Doney v.
Tambouratgis, 23 Cal. 3d 91, 587 P.2d 1160, 151 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1979) (assault, battery, and
attempted rape alleged; employer precluded from raising exclusivity as a defense on appeal
by failure to plead and prove it as an affirmative defense); Meyer v. Graphic Arts Int'l
Union Local No. 63-A, 63-B, 88 Cal. App. 3d 176, 151 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1979) (suit allowed for
assault, battery, false imprisonment, and rape). See also LeGrand & Leonard, Civil Suitsfor
SexualAssault: Compensating Rape Victims, 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 479, 498 n.58
(1979); Note, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort Acions, 10
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 879, 906-27 (1980) (complete discussion of the interplay between
civil suits for sexual harassment and workers' compensation, advocating right to sue and an
exception to exclusive remedy).
38. 2A LARSON, supra note 18, at § 65.20.
39. Note, The Treatment of Sexual Impairment Injuries Under Worker's Compensation
Laws, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1207, 1218 (1979).
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results in or becomes intertwined with a physical injury.40 Compensa-
tion benefits may be available in these circumstances. If so, the ques-
tion is whether an employee should be allowed to collect both a
compensation award and a damage award.41 If compensation benefits
are not available because earning capacity is not affected, the question
is whether the employee should be left with neither compensation nor
damages.
Because of the gross inequity in a case in which compensation
benefits will not be awarded, courts should allow a common-law suit.
Even when compensation benefits may be available, however, there are
strong policy reasons for allowing a common-law suit. The compensa-
tion awarded may fall short of "making whole" the tort victim. In ad-
dition, the deterrent effect of large damage awards, one of the basic
objectives of tort law and of any loss-distribution system, is not realized
when workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for an intentional
tort.42 An employer's workers' compensation insurance shields the em-
ployer from the full brunt of liability for his or her conduct. This result
is just if the employer is guilty only of negligence because the employer
is liable without fault under the workers' compensation system, but is
unjust if the employer has intentionally harmed an employee.
The California Case Law: Three Torts, Three Approaches
Several states have adopted statutes that address the problem of
work-related intentional torts by allowing a worker to sue his or her
employer for torts committed with "deliberate intention." 43 While
40. 2A LARSON, supra note 18, at § 68.30. Examples of such "overlaps" abound. See,
e.g., Doney v. Tambouratgis, 23 Cal. 3d 91, 587 P.2d 1160, 151 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1979) (as-
sault, battery, attempted rape, causing physical injuries and emotional distress); Unruh v.
Truck Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972) (combination of
assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress causes mental and physical break-
down); Meyer v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union Local No. 63-A, 63-B, 88 Cal. App. 3d 176, 151
Cal. Rptr. 597 (1979) (assault, battery, false imprisonment, and rape); Wright v. FMC Corp.,
81 Cal. App. 3d 777, 146 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1978) (alleged fraud induces employee to come into
contact with disabling chemicals).
41. Double recovery could be avoided by setting off compensation payments against
damages. Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 636, 498 P.2d 1063, 1077, 102 Cal. Rptr.
815, 829 (1972).
42. See 2A LARSON, supra note 18, at § 70.20.
43. See note 18 supra. However, state courts have not taken a uniform approach to
interpreting the phrase "deliberate intention" to produce injury. Compare Mandolidis v.
Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (W. Va. 1978) (conduct undertaken with "knowledge
and an appreciation of the high degree of risk of physical harm to another created thereby")
with Bakker v. Baza'r, Inc., 275 Or. 245, 253-54, 551 P.2d 1269, 1274 (1976) (employer must
have specific intent to injure employee and must use some means appropriate to that end).
Also, simply worded statutes that clearly purport to make workers' compensation the exclu-
sive remedy have been construed to allow suits for intentional torts. See Bryan v. Utah Int'l,
533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975) (suit against a supervisor allowed despite UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-
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such an approach may be desirable in California, it is unlikely that the
California legislature will expand the worker's tort remedies.44 Recent
legislative initiatives in other areas have attempted to contract or elimi-
nate judicial expansion of tort liability.45
Early California cases adhered to the exclusive remedy rule.46 To-
day California courts remain unwilling to allow tort remedies in every
situation in which the employer's conduct could be characterized as
intentional.47 The courts, however, have carved out three exceptions to
the exclusivity rule. These exceptions correspond roughly to three ar-
1-60 (1974), which makes the right to recover compensation "the exclusive remedy against
any officer, agent or employee of the employer").
44. See J. MASTORIS, CIVIL LITIGATION AND WORKERS COMPENSATION vi (1980);
"The legislature has been slow to act. Thus, decisional law may be the only remedy avail-
able in the future."
45. In 1978, the Legislature expressly overruled California Supreme Court decisions
imposing "tavern-keeper's liability." 1978 Cal. Stats. ch. 929, § 1, at 2903; CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 25602 (West Supp. 1981); see Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577
P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d
719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976); Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486
P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). The California Supreme Court reluctantly upheld
§ 25602 against a constitutional challenge in Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d 430, 629 P.2d 8,
174 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1981). "[O]ur constitutional inquiry does not seek to determine whether
the 1978 amendments were or are wise, sound, necessary, or in the public interest. There are
ample reasons for concluding otherwise." Id. at 437, 629 P.2d at 12, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
The court concluded that "[w]ith effort, a reasonable basis for the 1978 amendments may be
found." Id. at 441, 629 P.2d at 14, 174 Cal. Rptr. 506.
An attempt to repeal the landmark "market-share liability" decision in Sindell v. Ab-
bott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), failed in the
California State Assembly after passing the State Senate. Brickley, Trial Bar Wards Off
Drive to Dump Sindell, S.F. Recorder, Aug. 28, 1980, at I, col. 5.
A bill introduced by Assemblyman Howard Berman in the California Legislature for
the 1981-82 Regular Session would drastically alter the current compensation law by al-
lowing suits against the employer when:
(a) The injury or death is caused by a defective product manufactured by the defend-
ant.
(b) The injury or death is caused by services negligently furnished by the defendant.
(c) The injury or death results from the aggravation of a condition by failure to notify
the injured person, his or her physician, or the appropriate state agency of the condition and
its relationship to the employment. (This would seemingly apply to the Johns-Manville situ-
ation.)
(d) The injury or death was caused by the gross negligence or willful misconduct of the
defendant.
(e) The injury or death is a result of the defendant's knowingly ordering a person to
work in an unsafe environment and concealing the risk of injury from that person. Cal. A.B.
2031 (1981) (proposed CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.7).
At publication, no hearings had been scheduled or. the bill. Its chances of passage, at
least in its original form, were considered very slight.
46. See, e.g., Buttner v. American Bell Tel. Co., 41 Cal. App. 2d 581, 107 P.2d 439
(1940); DeCarli v. Associated Oil Co., 57 Cal. App. 310, 207 P. 282 (1922).
47. Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 474, 612 P.2d
948, 953-54, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 863 (1980). See also Busick v. Workmen's Compensation
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eas in which the exclusivity issue often arises: assault and battery,48
intentional infliction of emotional distress, 49 and concealment of a
known industrial disease or hazard.50 This Note examines these three
areas to determine whether the exclusivity rule should be abrogated.
Assault and Battery
The first major departure from the exclusive remedy doctrine in
California occurred in 1951, in Conway v. Globin.51 The Third District
Court of Appeal held that, because injuries resulting from a willful at-
tack did not arise out of the employment relationship and because such
an attack was not a risk or condition of the employment, the employee
could maintain a common-law tort suit against the employer. To hold
otherwise, the court said, "would be not only to sanction indirectly con-
duct of the employer which is both tortious and criminal, but also
would be to permit the employer to use the Workmen's Compensation
Act to shield him from his larger civil liability." 52
Only five years later, however, the Second District Court of Ap-
peal, in Carter v. Superior Court,53 rejected the notion that an assault
could not arise out of the employment relationship. The court found
instead that an employee who is assaulted has a choice of remedies: the
employee either may assert that the injury was employment-related
and seek workers' compensation, or may seek damages in an action at
law, asserting that the injury did not arise out of the employment.5 4
The employee, however, cannot collect both damages and compensa-
tion; if he or she establishes that the injury occurred by reason of a risk
incident to the employment, compensation is the exclusive remedy. If
it is established that the injury did not arise out of the employment,
then only the courts can grant relief. 55 As the plaintiff in Carter had
Appeals Bd., 7 Cal. 3d 967, 975 n.ll, 500 P.2d 1386, 1393 n.l1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48 n.ll
(1972).
48. See Magliulo v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
49. See McGee v. McNally, 119 Cal. App. 3d 891, 174 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1981); Renteria
v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978); cf. Unruh v. Truck Ins.
Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972) (intentional infliction of
emotional distress by insurer).
50. See Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948,
165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980).
51. 105 Cal. App. 2d 495, 233 P.2d 612 (1951).
52. Id. at 498, 233 P.2d at 614.
53. 142 Cal. App. 2d 350, 298 P.2d 598 (1956).
54. Id. at 355, 298 P.2d at 601.
55. Id. This reasoning followed that of the California Supreme Court in Scott v. In-
dustrial Accident Comm'n, 46 Cal. 2d 76, 293 P.2d 18 (1956), decided four months earlier.
"ITIhe only point of concurrent jurisdiction of the two tribunals appears to be jurisdiction to
determinejurisdiction; jurisdiction once determined will be exclusive, not concurrent." Id. at
83, 293 P.2d at 22 (emphasis in original).
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already received a final award from his employer's compensation car-
rier, he was precluded from pursuing a legal remedy against his
employer.56
In Azevedo v. Abel, 57 the Third District Court of Appeal found
that an employer's intentional tort could not give rise to a common-law
suit. InAzevedo, the employee of a retail dress shop was injured by her
employer, who was angered when he learned of a conversation she had
had with a customer.58 The employee first filed a claim for compensa-
tion benefits, which was denied when the Industrial Accident Commis-
sion held that it lacked jurisdiction to award benefits for an injury
intentionally inflicted by an employer. The appellate court, in Azevedo
v. IndustrialAccident CommisSion,59 reversed the compensation board's
decision, holding that a job-related, albeit intentionally inflicted, injury
is compensable. 60
Seeking compensatory and punitive damages, Mrs. Azevedo also
filed a suit in superior court. The court dismissed the action, holding
that workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy under California
Labor Code section 3601.61 In Azevedo v. Abel, the court of appeal
held that workers' compensation must remain the exclusive remedy
even when intentional torts have been committed. Any other holding
would be permissible "only by carving a judicial exception in an un-
carved statute,"'62 and would relegate the employee "to the dubious
benefit of a lawsuit he may lose."63 The court noted:
The theory which poses a civil action as a sanction against deliberate
torts is enfeebled by the compensation law's penalty for serious and
willful misconduct. Neither moral aversion to the employer's act nor
the shiny prospect of a large damage verdict justifies interference
with what is essentially a policy choice of the Legislature. The policy
choice is to provide employees economic insurance against disability
in exchange for the speculative possibility of general damages; to of-
fer the augmented award for serious and willful misconduct in trade
for the relatively rare award of punitive damages. 64
The Azevedo court's decisive rejection of common-law suits, and ac-
56. Carter v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 2d 350, 355, 298 P.2d 598, 601 (1956).
57. 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968).
58. Id. at 453, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 711. See Note, Azevedo v. Abel- Denial of Employee47
Right to Sue His Employer for an Intentional Tort, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 683, 687 (1970).
59. 243 Cal. App. 2d 370, 52 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1966).
60. Id. at 376-77, 52 Cal Rptr. at 287-88. The court disapproved its earlier decision in
Conway v. Globin, 105 Cal. App. 2d 495, 233 P.2d 612 (1951).
61. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1981) provides in part: "Where the conditions
of compensation exist, the right to recover such compensation, pursuant to the provisions of
this division is ... the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against the
employer ... ." See notes 35-36 & accompanying text supra.
62. 264 Cal. App. 2d at 459, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 459-60, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
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ceptance of compensation benefits for intentionally inflicted injuries,
was thought to have settled this area of the law.65
The exclusivity issue, however, was not resolved. In Magliulo v.
Superior Court, 66 the First District Court of Appeal concluded that
Azevedo v. Abel had been wrongly decided 67 and that an intentional
assault could support a common-law action for damages. Analyzing
California Labor Code section 4553,68 which provides a fifty percent
increase in benefits for serious and willful misconduct, the court con-
cluded that the statute should be applied only if the misconduct falls
between ordinary negligence and an intentional act. When the em-
ployer's conduct rises to the level of an intentional tort, a suit should be
permitted because an intentional assault "is of questionable relation-
ship to general conditions of employment. ' 69 The court held that, at
least until an award of workers' compensation benefits is made, or until
a civil suit judgment is recovered, the compensation and common law
remedies may be treated as cumulative, or alternative. 70
Magliulo created a conflict among the California courts of appeal
over whether compensation is the exclusive remedy for an on-the-job
assault. Subsequent cases have failed to resolve the conflict.7' Al-
though assaults may be of questionable relationship to employment, an
assault and battery may arise out of an employer's dissatisfaction with
an employee's work.72 In this situation, the assault may be as closely
related to the job as an accident stemming from the use of a machine.
65. See Note, Azevedo v Abel. Denial of Employee's Right to Sue His Employer for an
Intentional Tort, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 683, 690 (1970).
66. 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
67. "If we were to consider the question as one of first impression we would conclude
that the contention advanced by Mrs. Azevedo is a preferable solution." Id. at 777, 121 Cal.
Rptr. at 633-34.
68. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp. 1981).
69. Id. at 779, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
70. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 780, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
71. Meyer v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union Local No. 63-A, 63-B, 88 Cal. App. 3d 176, 151
Cal. Rptr. 597 (1979) followed Magliulo in allowing a suit for assault, battery, false impris-
onment, and rape. Johns-Manville expressly refused to resolve the conflict between Magliulo
and Azevedo regarding an employee's right to sue for a physical assault related to the em-
ployment: "That issue is not presented in this case, and we do not purport to address it." 27
Cal. 3d at 477 n.ll, 612 P.2d at 956 n.ll, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865 n.ll. Johns-Manville did,
however, approve of the cumulative remedy approach for aggravation of a job-related dis-
ease. Id. at 478-79, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
72. See, e.g., Azevedo v. Abel, 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968), in which
the employer's assault apparently stemmed from his anger about a conversation the em-
ployee had had with a customer. Cf. Busick v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 7
Cal. 3d 967, 500 P.2d 1386, 104 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1972) (employer's assault and battery of
employees who had started a competing business did not arise out of employment; $650,000
civil suit judgment precluded award of compensation); Magliulo v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.
App. 3d 760, 762-63, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621, 623 (1975) (injury arose out of argument in
kitchen).
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Courts have been reluctant to inquire in each case whether the
assault arose from a purely personal grievance or from a job-related
dispute. The common solution has been to set forth a broad rule gov-
erning all assaults. 73 In California, however, because of the conflict
between Azevedo and Magliulo, no general rule on assaults has
emerged.
In all assaults and batteries, the conduct is intentional and should
be discouraged. 74 Limiting an assaulted worker to the compensation
remedy indirectly sanctions "conduct of the employer which is both
tortious and criminal. ' 75 It permits the employer to avoid civil liability
and to assault with impunity. 76 If courts analyzed the assault cases in
terms of public policy, they would avoid case-by-case determinations of
whether a tort arose out of the employment. By deciding whether the
conduct alleged is assault and battery, courts can decide whether the
conduct gives rise to a common-law cause of action.
Arguably, plaintiffs, by artful pleading, can avoid exclusivity sim-
ply by alleging an assault and battery in even the most routine cases.
However, by requiring that the employer, rather than an agent of the
employer, commit the act, courts can minimize the frequency of this
allegation. 77 In the rare situation in which an employer commits an
actual, intentional assault and battery on an employee, the employer
should not be able to insure against liability for the conduct.
The policy of deterring intentional wrongs was rejected in Azevedo
v. Abel. 78 The Azevedo court reasoned that the provision for a fifty-
percent penalty for serious and willful misconduct, 79 in addition to the
prohibition of insuring against liability for this misconduct,80 ade-
73. See 2A LARSON, supra note 18, at § 68.21.
74. Professor Larson states that an intentional assault on the employee by an employer,
who acts in person and not constructively through an agent, grounds a common-law suit.
According to Professor Larson, the best theory in support of this result is that an intentional
assault is not an "accident." 2A LARSON, supra note 18, at § 68.11. In California, however,
compensation benefits are not conditioned on an "accident," so this theory is not persuasive.
Some courts have resorted to "resounding moralistic pronouncements" to justify exceptions
to the exclusivity rule. Id.
75. Conway v. Globin, 105 Cal. App. 2d 495, 498, 233 P.2d 612, 614 (1951).
76. "It would be anomalous to permit a defendant which, as in this case, acting through
its officer, assaulted the plaintiff herein, to say, 'I can assault you with impunity and the only
remedy you have is to take Workmen's Compensation which I have provided for you."'
Garcia v. Gusmack Restaurant Corp., 150 N.Y.S.2d 232, 233 (N.Y. City Ct. 1954), cited in
2A LARSON, supra note 18, at § 68.11.
77. See 2A LARSON, supra note 18, at § 68.11. The importance of pleading is demon-
strated in McGee v. McNally, 119 Cal. App. 3d 891, 174 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1981). See notes 93-
94 & accompanying text infra.
78. 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968). See text accompanying notes 57-64
supra.
79. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp. 1981).
80. CAL. INS. CODE § 11661 (West 1972).
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quately served the public policy against insuring for intentional
wrongs. 81 Moreover, the court suggested that the fifty-percent penalty
is a sufficient deterrent and an adequate substitute for the "relatively
rare" award of punitive damages. 82
The Azevedo court's reasoning, however, is no longer valid. First,
the serious and willful misconduct penalty, at fifty percent of the com-
pensation award up to a maximum of $10,000, no longer poses a suffi-
cient deterrent to intentional misconduct.8 3 Second, in cases in which
the damage inflicted by an assault and battery consists primarily of an
affront to dignity rather than a physical injury resulting in lost wages, a
penalty tied to compensation is an inadequate penalty. Damages suits
are a more effective deterrent and a more direct way of compensating
victims. Third, as the California courts have noted, in some cases the
tort has little relation to the employment and the injury is not caused
by the employment.8 4 Finally, as an employee who is assaulted can sue
a co-worker, a customer, or a supervisor, there is no valid reason to bar
a suit against the employer.85
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
A second major area in which the exclusivity issue often arises is
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The problem of
whether workers' compensation covers this tort has arisen frequently in
the last few years, and, as is the case with assault and battery, lower
courts have divided on whether the exclusive remedy rule should
apply.86
In cases involving extreme and outrageous intentional invasions of
mental and emotional tranquility, a plaintiff can recover for mental
suffering alone, even though no physical injuries occurred.8 7 The Cali-
81. 264 Cal. App. 2d at 458, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
82. Id. at 459-60, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
83. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp. 1981) also provides a $250 ceiling on costs and
expenses that can be awarded pursuant to that section. While this attempt to limit the cost
of securing an award is laudatory, it further serves to minimize the punitive effect of the
section.
84. Magliulo v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d at 779, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 635; Conway
v. Globin, 105 Cal. App. 2d at 498, 233 P.2d at 614.
85. The victim of a work-related assault can sue a customer or other third party, CAL.
LAB. CODE § 3852 (West 1971), or a fellow worker or supervisor. CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 3601(a)(1) (West Supp. 1981). See Magliulo v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d at 777, 121
Cal. Rptr. at 634.
86. Compare McGee v. McNally, 119 Cal. App. 3d 891, 174 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1981) (suit
allowed); Lagies v. Copley, 110 Cal. App. 3d 958, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1980) (same); Renteria
v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978) (same) with Gates v.
Trans Video Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 196, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1979) (suit barred); Ankeny v.
Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 151 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1979) (same).
87. Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970);
[Vol. 33
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
fornia Supreme Court in 1970, without discussing the exclusivity issue,
held that, because of his or her status as an employee, a plaintiff is
entitled to greater protection from outrageous conduct than is a stran-
ger to the employer.88
The first California case to address the question of the exclusive
remedy in the emotional distress context was Renteria v. County of Or-
ange,89 in which the plaintiff alleged that his employer and fellow em-
ployees had subjected him to racial discrimination and harassment
with the intent to cause him emotional distress.90 The plaintiff had suf-
fered no physical injuries, and thus could receive no compensation ben-
efits. The court concluded that the exclusivity rule should not bar his
complaint, because it would be inequitable to leave him remediless. 91
Within a year, however, Renteria was distinguished. Two court of
appeal cases concluded that workers' compensation is the exclusive
remedy when allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress
are accompanied by allegations of physical injury.92 These cases dis-
tinguished intentional infliction of emotional distress with physical in-
juries from the same tort without physical injuries. This distinction was
followed recently in McGee v. McNally, 93 in which the court allowed a
tort suit despite "oblique reference to physical harm," concluding that
the allegations of physical injury were only peripheral and added to the
complaint as a "makeweight. ' '94
The reasons for allowing a damage suit for intentional infliction of
emotional distress differ from those advanced for allowing a damage
suit for assault and battery. Assault and battery generally produce
physical consequences for which workers' compensation benefits may
be paid.95 Intentional infliction of emotional distress, however, usually
does not produce compensable physical injuries. When it does not, or
when the physical injuries are merely peripheral to the primary claim,
as in McGee, a damages suit should be allowed. Most cases involving
State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952), cited in
Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 840, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447, 451 (1978).
88. Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498 n.2, 468 P.2d 216, 218 n.2, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 88, 90 n.2 (1970).
89. 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978).
90. Id. at 835, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
91. Id. at 838-42, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 450-52. Seegenerally Larson, Nonphysical Torts and
Workmen's Compensation, 12 CAL. W.L. REv. 1 (1975); Comment, Intentional Employer
Torts and Workers' Compensation: . Legal Morass, 11 PAC. L.J. 187, 203 (1979).
92. Gates v. Trans Video Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 196, 205, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1979);
Ankeny v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 535, 151 Cal. Rptr. 828, 831
(1979).
93. 119 Cal. App. 3d 891, 174 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1981).
94. Id. at 894-95, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
95. See generally Larson, Nonphysical Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 12 CAL.
W.L. REV. 1, 12 (1975).
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intentional infliction of emotional distress are likely to involve non-
physical injuries, especially because the plaintiff need not show physi-
cal injuries to recover.96 The holding in Renteria, that employee inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress suits will be allowed if no physical
injury has occurred, was implicitly approved by the California
Supreme Court in Johns-Manville.97 This principle seems sound and is
likely to be followed.98
Intentional Exposure to and Concealment of Hazardous Conditions
The most troubling class of cases concerning the exclusive remedy
issue is the employer's alleged concealment of hazardous conditions
and substances. In an early case, Buttner v. American Bell Telephone
Co. 99 a California court of appeal set forth a general rule of nonliabil-
ity, holding that a suit would not lie on charges that the employer mis-
represented the nature of carbon tetrachloride by suggesting that it was
harmless when in fact it was highly dangerous. I°0 Early cases in other
jurisdictions are generally in accord with Buttner.'0'
96. See note 87 & accompanying text supra.
97. 27 Cal. 3d at 475 n.9, 612 P.2d at 954 n.9, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 864 n.9.
98. In Lagies v. Copley, 110 Cal. App. 3d 958, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1980), the Fourth
District Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff to bring a civil suit against his employer and
co-workers, despite allegations in the complaint that physical disability accompanied the
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 970, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 375. The court,
however, also found that plaintiff avoided the exclusive remedy bar because he alleged the
defendants had acted outside the course and scope of their employment. Id. at 969-70, 168
Cal. Rptr. at 374-75. Thus, the portion of the opinion regarding the right to sue despite
allegations of physical injury is dicta and is not likely to detract from the weight of the other
cases. McGee v. McNally, 119 Cal. App. 3d 891, 174 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1981), decided eight
months after Lagies, ignored it while discussing Renteria, Ankeny, and Gates.
Arguably, common-law suits should be allowed in all cases of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, including those alleging physical injury. If the employer's conduct is
outrageous enough to cause severe emotional distress as well as resulting physical injury, the
employee is just as deserving of redress as one who does not allege physical injury. The
current case law, however, would bar the former from a tort suit, but not the latter. Because
it is likely that this distinction will be adhered to in subsequent cases, careful pleaders may
have to omit physical injury allegations purposely to circumvent the exclusive remedy rule.
The reasoning of Renteria and the distinction along physical injury/non-physical injury
lines is criticized in J. MASTORIS, CIVIL LITIGATION AND WORKERS COMPENSATION 7-8
(1980). The author of this treatise, a workers' compensation judge, points out that the argu-
ment in Renferia that emotional distress must be accompanied by physical injuries as a
condition for recovery in compensation cases is not accurate. The Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board "has been handling intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress
for years." Id. at 8.
99. 41 Cal. App. 2d 581, 107 P.2d 439 (1940).
100. Id. at 584-86, 107 P.2d at 441.
101. See, e.g., Boyd v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 11 So. 2d 102 (La. App. 1942)
(fraudulent concealment of hazards of employment in a sugarhouse); Brooks v. American
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 7 So. 2d 658 (La. App. 1942) (same); Bevis v. Armco Steel Corp., 86
Ohio App. 525, 93 N.E. 2d 33 (1949), appeal dismissed per curlam, 153 Ohio St. 366, 91 N.E.
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The proliferation of toxic substances and hazardous chemicals in
the workplace has given rise in recent years to many claims of conceal-
ment of hazardous conditions and substances. Because of the large
number of potential plaintiffs, a consistent approach to the problem is
essential.
Phrased in starkest terms, the issue in these cases is whether inju-
ries produced by an employer's concealment of hazards are as deliber-
ately inflicted as a punch in the nose.10 2 In California, the issue is
whether the employee is limited to workers' compensation benefits for
such behavior, is entitled to a fifty-percent penalty because the conduct
is "serous and willful misconduct," or is permitted to bring a common-
law suit for intentionally inflicted injury.
Two kinds of conduct recur in the concealment area. The first in-
volves the toleration of a dangerous condition, such as unguarded ma-
chinery. In this class of cases, the employer is aware of and "put[s] his
mind" 103 to the existence of a hazard, but fails to do anything about it.
This conduct has various labels: negligence, extreme negligence, reck-
lessness, or intentional misconduct. 104 It may consist of a violation of a
safety statute or order, which gives rise to additional workers' compen-
sation benefits in some states. 105 It also usually meets the definition of
serious and willful misconduct, leading to additional compensation in
2d 479 (1950), cer. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950) (plaintiff alleged his silicosis had been aggra-
vated by employer's misrepresentation regarding medical examination). In a recent case,
the court allowed the employee to sue for fraudulent concealment of a silicosis condition, on
facts which it conceded were "almost identical" to Bevis, holding that Ohio's exclusive-rem-
edy statute "does not bestow upon employers immunity from civil liability for their torts"
because "[a] hazard of employment does not include the risk that the employer will deprive
an employee of his workers' compensation rights to medical treatment and compensation."
Delamotte v. Unitcast Div. of Midland Ross Corp., 64 Ohio App. 2d 159, 161-62, 411 N.E.
2d 814, 816 (1978) (citing OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Page 1973)). See generalo 2A
LARSON, supra note 18, at § 68.32.
102. See 2A LARSON, supra note 18, at § 68.13: "The intentional removal of a safety
device or toleration of a dangerous condition may or may not set the stage for an accidental
injury later. But in any normal use of the words, it cannot be said, if such an injury does
happen, that this was deliberate infliction of harm comparable to an intentional left jab to
the chin."
103. Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d at 474, 612 P.2d at
953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863. See text accompanying note 121 infra.
104. Id. The Johns-Manville decision suggests that such conduct could be called inten-
tional or even deceitfuL Professor Larson, however, states that knowingly permitting a haz-
ardous work condition to exist falls short of inflicting an intentional injury. 2A LARSON,
supra note 18, at § 68.13. Several cases have agreed with the Larson formulation. See, e.g.,
Phifer v. Union Carbide Corp., 492 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Griffin v. George's,
Inc., 267 Ark. 91, 96, 589 S.W. 2d 24, 27 (1979); Sanford v. Presto Mfg. Co., 92 N.M. 746,
748, 594 P.2d 1202, 1204 (1979).
105. See note 18 supra. See also E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
184 Cal. 180, 193 P. 105 (1920).
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California. 10 6
The second, more serious, type of conduct involves a calculated
deceit. The employer is charged with a conscious effort to mislead the
employee about the nature of the material with which he or she works,
and to prevent the employee from taking measures to protect his or her
health. These cases often involve substances that act over a long period
of time, produce insidious diseases, and affect large numbers of work-
ers. The nature of the hazard in these cases is less apparent to the aver-
age worker than is a potentially dangerous malfunctioning machine. 0 7
A policy of concealing hazards, if it exists, allows dangerous conditions
to continue. Because the employee is unaware of the condition, he or
she will not insist on a safe workplace. 08 Moreover, if the employee is
unaware that his or her disease is work-related, he or she may fail to
apply for workers' compensation or to contemplate filing suit. 1°9 This
conduct fits the classic definition of fraudulent concealment: "The hid-
ing or suppression of a material fact or circumstances which the party is
legally or morally bound to disclose. The employment of artifice
planned to prevent inquiry or escape investigation and to mislead or
106. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp. 1981) (50% up to $10,000); see also MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 28 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1965) (100%). See note 18 supra.
107. See generally 2A LARSON, supra note 18, at § 68.13 (citing Duncan v. Perry Packing
Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d 78 (1946), in which plaintiffs wife was electrocuted by a machine
which was improperly grounded and gave off electric shocks and flashes).
108. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Department of Industrial Relations in Reply to Cali-
fornia Workers' Compensation Institute and in Support of Real Party in Interest at 18,
Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (on file with the Hastings Law Journal): "Where a danger is obvious to the em-
ployee, the employer's duty is no less, but at least the employee has the theoretical choice of
refusing the hazardous work, and is protected in that choice by Labor Code § 6311, which
prohibits retaliation for refusing unsafe work." Workers could also petition for better work
conditions through their union, or even quit the job. Id. "Employers who willfully refuse to
disclose the identity and hazards of toxic substances to which employees are exposed thereby
frustrate the employee's and the Department's ability, through the employee's complaint, to
achieve safer and healthier work conditions." Id.
109. Johns-Manville was charged with withholding or lying about the results of medical
examinations. The amicus Department of Industrial Relations claimed that this was done to
deny employees access to workers' compensation benefits. Id.
The allegation that a company or its doctors would be less than candid when informing,
or not informing, an employee about his or her physical condition has also been made in
professional sports. Berkow, Permanent Injury: Pro Sports' Darker Side, S.F. Chronicle,
July 6, 1981, at 41, 46, col. 3, tells the story of Detroit Lions football star Charlie Sanders,
who was allegedly told he had "nothing to worry about" after suffering serious game-related
injuries. This article also claims that most football players are unaware of their rights under
the workers' compensation laws, despite the hazardous nature of their profession. See Ellis
v. Rocky Mountain Empire Sports, Inc., 602 P.2d 895 (Colo. App. 1979) (intentional tort
claim barred; exclusive remedy); Gambrell v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 562
S.W. 2d 163 (Mo. App. 1978) (suit alleging fraud and deceit in misrepresenting employee's
physical condition barred by exclusive remedy rule because resulting injury covered by
workers' compensation).
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hinder the acquisition of information disclosing a right of action."" 0
Although these cases were relatively rare in the past, litigation in-
volving substances such as hydrogen sulfide,"' pesticides, 12 and asbes-
tos"13 is increasing. Potential cases include those involving cancer
caused by nuclear or microwave radiation."14 The number of sub-
stances and industries affected by this issue is large, as is the number of
workers affected in each.' 15
Serious and Willful Misconduct
In states that allow, either by statute or by case law, a suit against
an employer who intentionally injures an employee, courts have strictly
construed the requirement of intention, especially when the employer's
action consisted of exposing the worker to hazards rather than of an
assault and battery." 6 A California worker, however, must surmount a
further obstacle to suit: the provision for added compensation in cases
of serious and willful misconduct. "7
The first detailed California discussion of the serious and willful
provision was in 1920, in E Clemens Horst Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission."" In Horst, the worker was injured when her hair was
caught by a revolving shaft. An award of $4.45 per week was made by
the Industrial Accident Commission, predecessor of the current Work-
110. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 596 (5th ed. 1979). Although material facts are known
to one party and not to the other, failure to disclose them is not actionable fraud unless a
fiduciary relationship exists, giving rise to a duty to disclose. Active concealment of facts,
however, may be fraudulent. 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 2724-25 (8th ed.
1973). Conduct seeking to conceal or prevent investigation and discovery of material facts is
worse than a failure to disclose. Id. at 2727. If the defendant alone has knowledge of mate-
rial facts that are not accessible to the plaintiff, a duty to disclose may arise without any
confidential relationship. Id. at 2726. An employer-employee relationship arguably gives
rise to a legal or moral duty to disclose.
11. E.g., Phifer v. Union Carbide Corp., 492 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
112. E.g., Wright v. FMC Corp., 81 Cal. App. 3d 777, 146 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1978).
113. See note 6 & accompanying text supra.
114. See generally Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 440 S.W. 2d 43 (Tex. 1969)
(no evidence presented in workers' compensation case that employee, who worked for four
and one-half years handling nuclear weapons material, contracted fatal cancer on the job).
115. The stakes are so high that the defense bar has warned that abrogation of exclusiv-
ity would open a "Pandora's box." Amicus Curiae Brief of California Workers' Compensa-
tion Institute in Support of Respondent at 50-51, Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior
Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (on file with the Hastings Law
Journal).
116. See, ag., Phifer v. Union Carbide Corp., 492 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (Ar-
kansas law); Petruska v. Johns-Manville, 83 F.R.D. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (New Jersey law);
Griffin v. George's, Inc., 267 Ark. 91, 589 S.W.2d 24 (1979); Sanford v. Presto Mfg. Co., 92
N.M. 746, 594 P.2d 1202 (1979).
117. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp. 1981).
118. 184 Cal. 180, 193 P. 105 (1920).
September 1981]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ers' Compensation Appeals Board, because of the employer's serious
and willful misconduct. 1 9 The California Supreme Court upheld the
award, noting that the shaft was unguarded in violation of a safety stat-
ute, and that there were no warning signs near the machine.120
The court defined serious and willful misconduct as "conduct
which the employer either knew, or ought to have known, if he had
turned his mind to the matter, to be conduct likely to jeopardize the
safety of his employees."''1 Circumstances surrounding the act had to
"evince a reckless disregard for the safety of others and a willingness to
inflict the injury complained of."' 22 The court also noted that the
award should be considered compensation, not exemplary damages,
because the basic compensation award "covers not the whole, but only
a part or a percentage of such loss."123
The Horst formula, "conduct likely to jeopardize the safety of his
employees" and circumstances evincing a "reckless disregard" for
safety, was left undisturbed until 1953, when the California Supreme
Court, in Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,124 im-
pliedly imposed higher standards of proof. Concluding that the em-
ployer was not guilty of serious and willful misconduct for its failure to
brace the prefabricated parts of a building that collapsed, 125 the court
quoted several possible definitions of serious and willful misconduct.
Some definitions were similar to the Horst formula, but others likened
serious and willful misconduct to conduct of a "quasi criminal na-
ture"'126 and gave assault and battery as examples of willful miscon-
duct.127 The court concluded that serious and willful misconduct
referred to "an act deliberately done for the express purpose of injuring
another, or intentionally performed either with knowledge that serious
injury is a probable result or with a positive, active, wanton, reckless
and absolute disregard for its possibly damaging consequences."' 2 8
The Mercer-Fraser decision has been used both to justify and to
annul findings of serious and willful misconduct. In Rogers Materials
119. Id. at 182-83, 193 P. at 106.
120. Id. at 184-85, 193 P. at 106-07.
121. Id. at 188, 193 P. at 108.
122. Id. at 189, 193 P. at 109 (quoting Louisville N.A. & C. Ry. v. Bryan, 107 Ind. 51, 53,
7 N.E. 807, 808 (1886)).
123. Id. at 193, 193 P. at 110 (citing Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 693,
151 P. 398 (1915)).
124. 40 Cal. 2d 102, 251 P.2d 955 (1953).
125. Id. at 107, 251 P.2d at 956-57.
126. Id. at 117, 251 P.2d at 962 (quoting Porter v. Hofman, 12 Cal. 2d 445, 447-48, 85
P.2d 447, 448 (1938)).
127. Id. at 116, 251 P.2d at 962 (quoting Donnelly v. Southern Pac. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 863,
869-70, 118 P.2d 465, 468 (1941)).
128. Id. at 120, 251 P.2d at 964.
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Co. v. IndustrialAccident Commission,129 the court held that failure to
take precautions, even when the employer's representative had warned
the employee of the danger, would support a finding of serious and
willful misconduct. 130 In so holding, the court restated one of the for-
mulations of Mercer-Fraser: "[A]n employer may be found guilty of
wilful misconduct when he has 'put his mind' to the existence of a dan-
ger to an employee and fails to take precautions to avert it.' 13 1 The
lower courts, following these decisions, have found no serious and will-
ful misconduct when the employer was unaware of previous mishaps
with machinery, 132 and when the employer was aware of a safety prob-
lem, but took only cursory and unsuccessful measures to solve it.133
The courts have also distinguished between an intentional act or
an intentional failure to act, which is not intended to cause injury,134
and an intentionally inflicted injury.135 The former can give rise to a
finding of serious and willful misconduct. The latter is an intentional
tort. A sensible distinction can be made between intentional acts in
which the employer knows the likely consequences of his or her acts-
but does not intend them-and acts that are intended to cause or are
substantially certain to cause injury.136
Although it has been argued that the legislative intent in enacting
the serious and willful misconduct provision was to bar intentional tort
suits, 137 the California compensation law grants benefits "irrespective
129. 63 Cal. 2d 717, 408 P.2d 737, 48 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1965).
130. Id. at 724-25, 408 P.2d at 742, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
131. Id. at 723, 408 P.2d at 741, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
132. See American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 79
Cal. App. 3d 615, 144 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1978).
133. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. Private Carriage v. Workers' Compensation Appeals
Bd., 96 Cal. Ap. 3d 923, 933, 935, 158 Cal. Rptr. 463, 468, 469 (1979) (two consolidated
actions: first, employer, informed that workers might trip and fall on hoses in the dark,
failed to keep yard properly lighted; second, employer failed to repair leaking ice machine
that made floor slippery).
134. See, ag., Johns-Manville Sales Corp. Private Carriage v. Workers' Compensation
Appeals Bd., 96 Cal. App. 3d 923, 933, 158 Cal. Rptr. 463, 468 (1979) (no serious and willful
misconduct found).
135. Magliulo v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 769, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621, 628
(1975) (suit allowed for assault). For a more complete discussion of Magliulo, see notes 66-
72 & accompanying text supra.
136. See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 914 n.9 (W. Va. 1978). But
see Griffin v. George's, Inc., 267 Ark. 91, 95, 589 S.W.2d 24, 26 (1979). See generally W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8A (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8
(1965). The distinction suggested here was not accepted in Johns-Manwille. See 27 Cal. 3d
at 472-74, 612 P.2d at 952-54, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 862-83 (1980). Professor Larson calls the
West Virginia court's holding in Mandolidis, that a worker can sue the employer for willful,
wanton, and reckless misconduct, "distinctly out-of-line." 2A LARSON, supra note 18, at
§ 68.13 (1981 Supp. at 59).
137. Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d at 471-72, 612 P.2d at
951-52, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 861-62.
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of the fault of any party" 138 and "without regard to negligence." 139 Ar-
guably, then, the compensation law was intended to bar civil suits only
for negligence, not for intentional torts. Moreover, section 3600(g) of
the California Labor Code bars compensation for an injury arising out
of an altercation in which the injured employee is the "initial physical
aggressor." 140 This section thus suggests that intentional wrongs are
not, or should not be, exclusively covered by the compensation system.
Even if courts fully recognize legislative intent, they cannot ignore
considerations of culpability. The provision for additional compensa-
tion in cases of serious and willful misconduct requires courts to con-
sider culpability.141 Allowing common-law tort suits in rare instances
of aggravated employer malfeasance would be a logical extension of
these culpability considerations.
Finally, although the serious and willful misconduct provision was
designed to provide a fuller measure of compensation than does the
normal award of benefits, 142 compensation benefits are woefully inade-
quate in certain instances, 143 and both the award of additional compen-
sation and a common-law suit should be available in those instances.
Johns-Manville and the Three-Tiered Approach
The California Supreme Court in Johns-Manville held that the se-
138. 1917 Cal. Stats. ch. 586, § 1, at 832.
139. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1981).
140. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(g) (West Supp. 1981). In Mathews v. Workmen's Compen-
sation Appeals Bd., 6 Cal. 3d 719, 493 P.2d 1165, 100 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1972), the California
Supreme Court upheld the validity of § 3600(g). The court analyzed at length the origin of
the compensation act and concluded that nothing forbids the legislature from conditioning
compensation on the absence of intentional wrongdoing. It found that "fault" and "negli-
gence" are equivalent. Id. at 734-35, 493 P.2d at 1175-76, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 311-12.
141. See Rogers Materials Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 63 Cal. 2d 717, 726, 408
P.2d 737, 743, 48 Cal. Rptr. 129, 135 (1965) (court rejected employer's contention that, "no
matter how culpable an employer's conduct may be, he cannot be found guilty of wilful
misconduct simply because his act or omission coincided with his violation of a safety order
of which he had no prior knowledge"). But see Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior
Court, 27 Cal. 3d at 474, 612 P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863 (1980) (warning that to focus
on "state of knowledge" of dangerous conditions "would undermine the underlying premise
upon which the workers' compensation system is based"). See also Foley v. Polaroid Corp.,
- Mass. __ 413 N.E.2d 711, 716 (1980) (quoting Gambrell v. Kansas City Chiefs Football
Club, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Mo. App. 1978)): "[T]he key to whether the Workmen's
Compensation Act precludes a common law right of action lies in the nature of the injury for
which plaintiff makes claim, not the nature of the defendant's act which the plaintiff alleges
to have been responsible for that injury." Foley barred a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, because compensation benefits could be paid, but allowed claims for
defamation, malicious prosecution, violation of civil rights, and loss of consortium.
142. See E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 184 Cal. at 193, 193 P. at
110, discussed in notes 118-23 & accompanying text supra.
143. See notes 32-42 & accompanying text supra.
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rious and willful provision precludes a common-law remedy for em-
ployees injured "in the first instance" as the result of a deliberate
failure to assure workplace safety. 144 In considering allegations of "fla-
grant"'145 conduct, however, the court discussed cases that have allowed
damages suits,146 and found a "trend" towards allowing a common-law
action in two situations: when the employer acts deliberately for the
purpose of injuring an employee, and when the harm resulting from
the intentional misconduct consists of aggravation of a work-related
injury.147 The court, however, expressly refused to resolve the conflict
between Magliulo and Azevedo 148 over an employee's right to sue his or
her employer for an assault. 49 Moreover, the court failed to resolve
the issue of an employee's right to sue for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, although it appeared to approve of the cases allowing
the employee to sue when physical injury is not alleged but barring suit
when physical injury accompanies emotional distress.' 50
Johns-Manville broadens the availability of suit for cases in which
concealment of industrial hazards is alleged. Although the court's
holding is a narrow one,15' allowing a suit only for aggravation of, and
not for contracting, the disease, any employee who has contracted an
insidious disease and alleges that the employer concealed the cause and
the existence of the disease will probably be able to survive a demurrer.
Thus, in cases in which the employer can be charged with a calculating
cover-up of an existing disease, 152 exclusivity will no longer bar com-
mon-law suits. Furthermore, by placing the burden of apportioning
damages between contracting the disease and aggravating it on the de-
fendant, 153 the court facilitates a plaintiff's recovery.
Johns-Manville does not, however, affect cases involving toleration
of dangerous conditions.' 54 The remedy for unguarded machinery and
144. 27 Cal. 3d at 474, 612 P.2d at 954, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
145. Id. at 478, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
146. Id. at 475-76, 612 P.2d at 954-55, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 864-65.
147. Id. at 476, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
148. See notes 57-85 & accompanying text supra.
149. 27 Cal. 3d at 477 n. 11, 612 P.2d at 956 n.11,165 Cal. Rptr. at 865 n. 11. The court's
July 3, 1980 slip opinion was modified on August 28, 1980 to include the first paragraph of
footnote 11. The modification persuaded Justice Wiley Manuel, who had originally written
a concurring and dissenting opinion criticizing the court for purporting to resolve the
Azevedo-Magliulo dispute, to join the court's opinion. See 27 Cal. 3d at 488.
150. 27 Cal. 3d at 475 n.9, 612 P.2d at 954 n.9, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 864 n.9.
151. See J. MASTORIS, CMqL LITIGATION AND WORKERS COMPENSATION, 11 (1980):
"[TIhe new tort cause of action created in [Johns-Manville] is narrow and limited. Only
when 'compensation is available' would the fraudulent... [employer's] conduct create a
civil cause of action."
152. See notes 107-15 & accompanying text supra.
153. Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d at 477 n.11, 612 P.2d
at 956 n.ll, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865 n.ll.
154. See notes 103-06 & accompanying text supra.
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similar hazards is exclusively workers' compensation, buttressed by the
serious and willful misconduct provision. Insofar as the court held that
serious and willful misconduct encompasses "deliberate failure to as-
sure that the physical environment of the work place is safe,"' 55 it re-
mained faithful to its precedents. 156
The court in Johns-Manville impliedly established a three-tiered
approach to culpability. (1) If the employer negligently subjects an em-
ployee to dangerous working conditions, compensation will be the ex-
clusive remedy and no penalty will be imposed. (2) If, on the other
hand, the employer "puts his mind" to a dangerous condition and fails
to do anything about it, compensation is still the exclusive remedy but
the employer will also be liable for the fifty-percent "serious and will-
ful" addition. 57 (3) Finally, if the employer not only exposes workers
to hazardous conditions but also actively conceals those conditions and
the workers' disease, this "flagrant" conduct will justify a common-law
suit.' 58 This sensible approach takes proper account of culpability
while preserving the statutory framework of the California compensa-
tion system. Despite the lack of explicit legislative authority for the
holding, it is justified by considerations of public policy, the need to
deter "rare instances of malicious oppression," 159 inadequacy of the
current compensation remedy in some situations, and the argument
that the compensation act bars only negligence suits. 160
The court, however, should not have allowed a cause of action
only for aggravation of an existing job-related disease. This holding
was based largely on Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange.'6' Reliance
on Unruh is misplaced. In Unruh, there were two separate injuries.
The first, a physical injury, arose out of the employment. The second,
emotional distress inflicted by the employer's insurance carrier, did not
arise out of the employment and was caused by events entirely separate
from the initial, compensable injury. 162 Thus, in Unruh, it was reason-
able to allow an action at law for "aggravation" of the initial injury,
because the "aggravation" was a separate injury, with a distinct
cause. 
63
155. 27 Cal. 3d at 474, 612 P.2d at 954, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
156. See notes 116-31 & accompanying text supra.
157. See notes 124-31 & accompanying text supra.
158. Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d at 478, 612 P.2d at
956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
159. McGee v. McNally, 119 Cal. App. 3d 891, 895, 174 Cal. Rptr. 253, 256 (1981).
160. See notes 138-40 & accompanying text supra.
161. 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972).
162. Id. at 620-21, 498 P.2d at 1066-67, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19.
163. Professor Larson noted that in Unruh "there were two distinct injuries, rather than
one; and. .. the dominant feature of the tort claim was not personal injury, but intangible
emotional damage. . . . [T]he second injury was not a mere aggravation of the first, but was
utterly different in kind. . . . lIt] had nothing to do with an aggravation of the back condi-
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In Johns-Manville, on the other hand, the plaintiff suffered from
one continuing disease and alleged a continuing course of conduct-
concealment. The alleged acts of concealment occurred both before the
employee contracted the industrial disease (concealing and lying about
the dangers of the workplace) and after he got the disease (concealing
from the company doctor the existence of the disease and its cause). 164
The court drew an artificial line by allowing suit only for aggravation
of the disease. Reliance on Unruh does not support the court's reason-
ing, either in logic or in precedent. 165 Although the court in Johns-
Manville states that Unruh involved an "aggravation" of the initial in-
jury, Unruh involved two distinct injuries,166 whereas Johns-Manville
involved only one. 167
The court's distinction in Johns-Manville between causation and
aggravation implies that the employer need not disclose workplace
hazards to the employee. Under Johns-Manville, concealment of the
initial hazards of the job will not support a common-law suit; only con-
cealment of the disease will allow a suit for damages.168 The court en-
deavored to minimize fears that its holding would result in limitless
litigation, 69 but by limiting its holding, the court has given employers
tion." Larson, Nonphysical Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 12 CAL. W.L. REv. 1, 15-16
(1975). The court noted in Unruh that the plaintiff was seeking damages not for the initial
industrial injury, but for injuries "subsequently occurring from entirely distinct events." 7
Cal. 3d at 637, 498 P.2d at 1078, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 830. One commentator, however, states
that the court "conveniently overlooks the fact that in this very case the Appeals Board had
already held the 'entirely distinct events' to arise out of the 'initial industrial injury' and to
be fully compensable. Accordingly, the attempt semantically to avoid the impact of estab-
lished precedent becomes a distinction without a significant difference." Hanna, Exclusiviy
of Workmen's Compensation Remedy in Relation to Further Injury Resultingfrom Carrier's
NonmedicalInvestigation ofExtent ofEmployee's Industrial Disability, 5 Sw. U.L. REV. 118,
132-33 (1973). Professor Larson, however, asserts that calling the second injury an aggrava-
tion of the first because the insurer's investigation related to the first requires accepting a
"but-for theory that could lead to preposterous results." Larson, Nonphysical Torts and
Workmen's Compensation, 12 CAL. W.L. REv. 1, 17 (1975).
164. Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d at 469, 612 P.2d at
950, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
165. The Court's reliance on Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp., 173 Cal. App. 2d 386,
343 P.2d 787 (1959), is no more convincing than its reliance on Unruh. Ramey involved "a
later injury which is separate from but related to the first injury." Johns-Manville Products
Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d at 476, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865. The "later
injury" in Ramey was the employer's concealment of the fact that the employee had a cause
of action against a third party. This concealment induced the employee to forego a tort
action against the third party.
166. See note 163 supra.
167. See text accompanying note 164 supra.
168. 27 Cal. 3d at 477, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
169. "[W]e do not subscribe to the fears of defendant that a holding in plaintif's favor
would open up a Pandora's box of actions at law seeking damages for numerous industrial
diseases." 27 Cal. 3d at 478, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866. Indeed, few employers
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great latitude to expose workers to toxic substances. 70
The court, however, could also have avoided unlimited litigation
by requiring the employee to show active concealment, rather than
non-disclosure, of workplace hazards.' 71 This requirement would pre-
serve a "three-tiered" approach to culpability by distinguishing those
who "put their mind" to a danger and fail to correct it from those who
actively seek to conceal or suppress information about the hazards of
their industry, thereby preventing others from investigating and discov-
ering dangers. 72 Under this approach, the employee would have to
show that the employer actively concealed information or lied about
the conditions of employment. If this were shown, the employee could
recover for the initial injury.
Limiting damages suits to active or fraudulent concealment of
workplace hazards would give greater protection to workers, 173 would
avoid the artificial line drawn between causation and aggravation in
Johns-Manville, and would still restrict the number of damages suits.
In addition, this limitation would be consistent with a definition of in-
tentional torts that includes those actions undertaken with the intent to
injure or the intent to take an action substantially certain to cause
injury. 74
Conclusion
The uncertainty that surrounds California compensation law re-
mains, despite the Johns-Manville decision. The question expressly left
unresolved in Johns-Manville, whether an employer can be sued for
assaulting and battering an employee, will be raised again. An affirma-
are likely to aggravate the effects of an industrial injury by concealing its connection with
the job. See id.
170. See Letter from Patricia Gates, attorney for Amicus Curiae California Department
of Industrial Relations, to Rose Bird, Chief Justice, California Supreme Court (July 29,
1980) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal). This letter complained that the Johns-
Manville decision "not only acknowledges that employers conceal health hazards from their
employees, but also seems to expect employees to 'anticipate' such deception." The Johns-
Manville opinion was subsequently modified to meet some of the objections expressed in the
letter. Compare slip op. at 17 with 27 Cal. 3d at 477, 612 P.2d at 955-56, 165 Cal. Rptr. at
865 (original opinion indicated that plaintiff "could have anticipated he might be injured
because defendant concealed the dangers of the work place").
171. See notes 108-10 & accompanying text supra. One commentator, while discussing
the duty of a seller of real property, notes that active concealment, that is, conduct seeking to
conceal defects or prevent investigation and discovery of material facts, is more "obnoxious"
than mere failure to disclose. 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 2727 (8th ed.
1973).
172. See note 108 supra.
173. Cf. Note, Workmen's Compensation: Employer Misconduct and the Exclusive Rem-
edy, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 704, 711 (1979) (continuation of exclusivity means "the public's inter-
est in employee health and safety will take second place to the employer's desire for profit").
174. See notes 134-36 & accompanying text supra.
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tive answer to this question would satisfy public policy goals and elimi-
nate the present incongruity that allows a worker to sue a co-employee
or a customer, but not an employer who batters the worker.
In the area of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court seems to have left intact lower court decisions
allowing suit when no physical injury is present, but disallowing suit
when compensible physical injury is shown. Although suit should be
allowed in both instances, the court's current policy avoids the injustice
of leaving victims of this tort completely remediless.
Finally, in the area of exposure to and concealment of insidious
industrial hazards, the court has approved, in a very limited sphere, a
"three-tiered approach," which will allow in some cases a common-law
suit for an employer's concealment of an employee's disease and its
connection with the employment. Although this approach is basically
sound, the distinction between causation and aggravation of the disease
is artificial. The court could still distinguish between "serious and will-
ful misconduct" and intentionally tortious conduct, denying a tort rem-
edy for the former and allowing it for the latter, by allowing an
employee to recover damages for his or her initial injuries when the
employer fraudulently and actively conceals or lies about the existence
of an employment hazard.
Karl Olson *
* Member, Third Year Class.
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